INTRODUCTION
Resolving internal displacement – and
preventing future displacement – is inextricably linked to achieving lasting
peace. On one hand, unresolved problems of displacement may cause instability
and thus threaten peacebuilding efforts. On the other hand, durable solutions,
particularly return, cannot be achieved for internally displaced persons as
long as there is a lack of security; property is not restored; and conditions
for sustainable solutions are not in place.
This submission draws on recent country missions undertaken by the Representative of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (the Representative), as well as additional material, to identify key lessons learned and offer recommendations on how better to address internal displacement in peacebuilding.
THE
DISPLACEMENT-PEACE NEXUS
Today, there are some 25 million internally
displaced persons in over 50 countries worldwide who have been forced to leave
their communities by conflicts.[2] The total number of IDPs far exceeds the
world’s ten million refugees.[3] IDPs also often have particular
vulnerabilities that distinguish them both from refugees and other war-affected
civilians and that need specific attention in peace processes and
peacebuilding.
Edited by Nicolás Rodríguez Serna and David
James Cantor 2017
The process of peacebuilding is
multi-faceted, involving re-establishing security and law and order;
reconstruction and economic rehabilitation; reconciliation and social
rehabilitation; and political transition to creating more accountable
governance structures and institutions. The ways in which IDPs benefit from
these processes may well affect the success of country-wide peacebuilding
initiatives. For example, if the situation in communities of origin is not
perceived as safe by displaced persons, they will not return. Or if they do
return, they may move again if security is inadequate. Similarly, if
reconstruction and economic rehabilitation are not sufficient to enable the
displaced to resume economic livelihoods, return will not be sustainable.
Experience has shown that IDPs who do return can play an important role in
rebuilding their homes and communities and thus in contributing to the economic
development of the country. Political transitions need to take into account the
particular needs of IDPs, for example to enable them to vote on interim
political arrangements and to participate in the political life of the country
– even before they return to their communities of origin. Finally, issues of
reconciliation are closely related to issues of justice and to demands for
restitution or compensation for losses which have been experienced.
The way in which these issues are resolved
will have a major impact on the sustainability of peace in the country. Helping
displaced populations to return and reintegrate can simultaneously address the
root causes of a conflict and help prevent further displacement. Specifically:
the return of displaced populations can be an important signifier of peace and
the end of conflict; return can play an important part in validating the
post-conflict political order, for example by legitimizing elections; and
returnees can help to rebuild and revitalize local economies. Furthermore, in
many countries, whether willingly or unwillingly, some IDPs have become party
to the conflict, and their inclusion is therefore necessary for
conflict-resolution. On the other hand, returns that are not well prepared and
managed may trigger new tensions with local communities or cause returnees to
leave again and thus become a destabilizing factor.
AUTHOR
Former Brookings Expert
Experience has shown that peace agreements
alone are not sufficient to ensure the successful and durable return of IDPs
and refugees to their homes and former places of habitual residence. Four
critical additional elements are[4]:
Ensuring
voluntariness of return
Return should take place voluntarily based
on an informed decision by the persons concerned without coercion of any kind.
IDPs are usually citizens of their country and enjoy like all other citizens
the rights to liberty of movement and to choose their residence, and thus are
entitled to choose whether they want to return to the place of origin,
integrate locally where they were displaced, or resettle in another part of the
country. Experience shows that unless displacement has lasted for a very long
period, the majority of IDPs opt to return in post-conflict situations.
Ensuring
the safety of returnees
Returnees must not suffer from attacks,
harassment, intimidation and persecution or any other form of punitive action
upon return to their home communities, or from the dangers of landmines and
UXOs.
Returning property to the displaced and
reconstruction of their houses
At a minimum returnees must have access to
mechanisms for property restitution or compensation.
Creating an environment that sustains
return, including through appropriate funding mechanisms
Returnees must have access without
discrimination to basic public services, documentation and employment and
income-generating opportunities.
The following short case studies, based on
recent missions carried out by the Representative, illustrate these
experiences.
Sudan
In Sudan, IDPs fled the conflict in
Southern Sudan and numbered about four million while a further half a million
people sought asylum abroad. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement in January 2005, it was widely expected that many if not most of them
up would return to their communities in the South within a short period of
time. In reality, return movements have been relatively slow and to date less
than 1.2 million have returned, despite difficult living conditions at their
present locations, in particular in and around Khartoum. The majority of those
who have returned was displaced within Southern Sudan.[5] There are also credible
reports that some returnees have decided to go back to Khartoum because of the
lack of infrastructure and access to services in their home areas.
In his report[6] on a mission undertaken in
October 2005, the Representative identified several obstacles to return which
needed, and to a large extent still need, to be addressed.
Regarding security: the lack of
disarmament; the failure to relocate militias integrated into the Southern
Sudanese security forces (SPLM) from areas where they had been causing displacement;
the presence of an estimated one million landmines; the absence of the rule of
law in many areas; as well as inter- and intra-communal tensions over access to
land, all contributed to IDPs’ and returnees’ concerns for their physical
safety. Law enforcement was limited, and in various locations police were
either not present at all, or unable to leave their offices in town centers
because of a lack of transport. The judicial system was also largely
dysfunctional.
Property and land issues were less of a
problem, although there was no mechanism for the allocation of land to persons
who could not return to their original lands. There were some reports about
returnees encroaching on others’ lands as well as the destructive potential of
tribal differences over territorial boundaries and conflicting use of land by
pastoralists and nomads. More tensions concerning land and property
repossession and redistribution were anticipated in urban areas and suburbs
where most returnees were expected to settle. There was and still is no uniform
policy, comprehensive legislation or review mechanism which can be applied to
property claims, meaning that local authorities will have to deal with these
cases on an ad hoc basis which may render the process vulnerable to corruption
and discrimination.
Reconstruction in the sense of the creation
of adequate economic, social and political conditions is a particularly
significant challenge in an area as vast, devastated and underdeveloped as
Southern Sudan. While living conditions in southern Sudan are in many respects
extremely difficult for the population at large, IDPs and returnees face
additional obstacles and accordingly have specific protection and assistance
needs. Many returnees rely on the generosity of relatives for their food, while
those not willing or able to return to their areas of origin find it extremely
difficult to access food. Many returnees are trying to sustain themselves
through agriculture, but rarely have adequate tools. Many of those who had been
displaced for a long time to urban areas lack the knowledge and skills required
to farm successfully. Another major factor deterring returnees from settling in
rural areas has been limited or no access to education. The institutional
capacity of authorities to absorb and integrate large numbers of returnees was
and remains very limited as the war has left a virtual vacuum in state
structures in the South. The slow pace in rebuilding Southern Sudan and its
state structures results from a combination of lack of funds, absence of
capacity at the local level and the sheer magnitude of the task.
Lessons
learned
There are many lessons that can be drawn
from the experience of Sudan, most notably the importance of ensuring adequate
infrastructure, public services, and resources in communities of origin. Peace
agreements alone are not enough to encourage internally displaced persons to
return to their homes. The case of Sudan also illustrates both the fragility of
peace agreements and the interconnections between displacement and political
stability. The return of Southern Sudanese to their region is a key aspect of
the peace agreement and central to the eventual referendum which will determine
the future of the region. If IDPs cannot return in a timely fashion, there are questions
about the sustainability of the peace agreement itself.
Côte d’Ivoire
In Côte d’Ivoire, an estimated 500,000 to
one million people were displaced by the conflict that broke out in September
2002, some 98 percent of whom live with families, rather than in camps. The
March 2007 Ouagadougou peace accord, which addressed the fate of internally
displaced persons and envisaged the implementation of an aid program for the
displaced, opened a window of opportunity for returns, which started to take
place in the West and to the North of the country. This made it necessary to
address several needs at the same time.
In Western Côte d’Ivoire it was necessary
to address: outstanding security issues caused by the continuing presence of
armed elements in certain areas; the task of reconciling returnees and
receiving communities and of protecting returnees against discrimination;
transitory humanitarian needs until the full resumption of agricultural
activities; reconstruction of basic services and infrastructure; as well as the
re-installation of state administration. The task is particularly complex
because of the particular nature of displacement in this part of the country:
Displaced communities took refuge in areas where their arrival caused the
displacement of other communities which in turn caused the displacement of
still other communities. This chain of displacement can only be reversed if
returns take place in a chain too, with one village after another becoming
available for return after IDPs settled there have been able to go back to
their place of origin. The fact that in recent weeks returnees have left their
homes again and sought refuge in former camps indicates that the entire return
process may be in jeopardy.
In the North, the absence of jobs in urban
areas, the restitution of property, the vulnerability of female headed households
among the returnees, the absence of state administration and services, as well
as insecurity caused by bandits, were the main challenges. At this crucial
juncture, humanitarian organizations including UNHCR and IOM came close to
terminating their activities for lack of funds: large humanitarian donors had
declared that the humanitarian crisis in Côte d’Ivoire was over and development
funds that were pledged had not yet been made available. At the present time,
agencies report that in the West, returnees are starting to leave their
villages and trying to come back to camps where they hope to receive
assistance.[7] Another partially unresolved problem is the issue of
registration of displaced persons and returnees for the forthcoming elections
and the participation of those who have not yet returned in these elections.
Lessons
learned
The case of Côte d’Ivoire illustrates the
importance of seeing the period immediately following the resolution of a
conflict as a ‘window of opportunity’ to consolidate the peace. Too often,
however, the international humanitarian community withdraws from post-conflict
situations before conditions are right for development actors to provide
assistance which is desperately needed to prevent renewed conflict. While Côte
d’Ivoire is not a classic humanitarian emergency, assistance that goes beyond
humanitarian support and includes elements of development is urgently needed to
support the IDPs to find solutions that are durable and will allow the country
as a whole to consolidate the peace. The case also illustrates the weaknesses
in the present funding mechanisms that help to reinforce and perpetuate the gap
between the humanitarian and recovery/development phases.
Bosnia
and Herzegovina[8]
The signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement
in December 1995 offered hopes of resolving internal displacement in Bosnia and
Herzegovina for approximately one million people and for an additional 1.2
million refugees. Since 1995, more than 566,000 IDPs have returned to their
places of origin as well as more than 441,000 refugees. During the four years
following the war, hardly any minority returns took place although by May 2005
UNHCR had recorded some 450,000 minority returns – comprising about half of the
total returnees.
When the Representative visited the country
in 2005, the remaining IDPs suffered mainly from problems concerning their
economic and social rights and constituted about 45 percent of the extremely
poor in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and about 21 percent in the
Republika Srpska. Several thousand people, in particular vulnerable groups such
as female-headed households, elderly persons without family support and the
disabled, still lived in irregular collective centers.
Security: As a result of the efforts of the
international community and national authorities, general physical security can
be considered one of the achievements of the return process. In some instances,
however, tensions between local communities and returnees have led to isolated
acts of violence, some of them ethnically motivated. Land mines in agricultural
areas also posed a significant obstacle to the safety of returnees and to the
sustainability of their return.
Property and land issues: Bosnia and
Herzegovina was the first example of a successfully implemented mass
restitution in the wake of a full-blown conflict.[9] The Dayton Peace Agreement
created strong preconditions for property restitution including both binding
obligations on the domestic authorities to return the homes of the displaced
and quasi-international bodies to assist with the task.[10] Finally, the Office
of the High Representative was instrumental in encouraging – and where
necessary, enforcing – domestic implementation of the property laws allowing
for restitution. In a lengthy and complicated process, some 93 percent of the
200,000 property claims lodged by pre-war owners had been confirmed and
implemented by the end of 2003.[11] However some obstacles remained, including
difficulties for minorities, in particular Roma, to assert their property
rights and access permits or assistance in reconstruction. Resources for
reconstruction became scarce when donors started directing their funds to other
priorities.
Adequate economic, social and political
conditions: The creation of an adequate economic and social environment remains
the largest challenge to sustainable return and has led to a decrease in the
overall rate of returns. There are many cases in which returnees have left
again after a short while, or where families with children in particular have
not returned. While living conditions in many return areas are difficult for
the resident population too, many returnees faced and continue to face
additional, specific difficulties, often caused by insufficient respect for
their human rights, including discrimination regarding access to employment and
education. Access of IDPs and returnees to healthcare and social security is
adversely affected by the lack of harmonization between the relevant
legislation and welfare systems of the two entities constituting Bosnia and
Herzegovina: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.
Lessons
learned
In comparison with the two African cases
examined here, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterized by sustained
and impressive international assistance and monitoring of the implementation of
domestic policies. For example, the largely successful efforts to return
property or compensate owners for their losses enabled many IDPs to find
durable solutions, and have been key to peace-building. Yet, there are still
too many people, particularly vulnerable groups, who remain displaced. One of
the lessons of Bosnia is that successful property restitution alone does not
create the adequate environment for sustainable return. Discrimination with
regard to access to basic public services, education and income-generating
activities, prevents the displaced from returning or prompts returnees to leave
their homes again. In order to have access to livelihoods, agricultural lands
should be cleared from landmines before return takes place. In addition, there
is a need for return policies to take into account the needs of vulnerable IDPs
in order to ensure that all of those displaced by conflict are able to find
durable solutions.
Before drawing some general conclusions, it
is appropriate to comment on the displacement situation in the two countries on
which the Peacebuilding Commission has focused during the past two years.
Burundi
The conflict in Burundi led to an estimated
300,000 deaths and the displacement of almost 500,000 people.[12] A 2003 peace
deal elaborated a critical power-sharing agreement between Tutsis and Hutus
which carved the way for further negotiations. The official end to the civil
war came in 2005, with successive local, parliamentary and presidential
elections.[13] The last remaining rebel group, the National Liberation Forces
(FNL), signed a cease-fire agreement with the Government in September 2006,
although its implementation has fallen behind schedule. Despite these political
achievements, some IDPs remain reluctant to return to their home areas, mostly
in the central and northern provinces.[14]
As of 2006, about 100,000 IDPs remained in
settlements throughout the country.[15] An additional unknown number of displaced
people continue to live with host families in towns and villages. Of the latter
group, many have integrated into their host societies and do not wish to
return. Others, however, do want to return to their home areas but cite a
continued fear of future violence, a lack of shelter, and the lack of economic
opportunities – precisely the three conditions suggested in this briefing paper
as central to sustainable return. Reports suggest that while the living
conditions of some IDPs are better than that which they experienced prior to
their displacement, some others are much worse off and are unable to regain
autonomy or build adequate shelter. Land issues are also a serious impediment
to return; in particular for widows (women cannot inherit land in Burundi). The
increased value of land and the high prevalence of secondary occupancy are also
preventing returns in some cases.[16] At the same time more than 75 percent of
IDPs are able to access their land on a daily basis because they were displaced
over a short distance. A population census planned for August 2008 will provide
fresh data on the number and situation of IDPs in the country.
Lessons
Learned
Government initiatives to facilitate the
return and resettlement of IDPs have been limited. The latest scheme,
introduced by the Government in February 2006, has received little support from
the donor community.[17] Recent fighting between the Government and FNL forces
has resulted in new short-term displacement, suggesting that IDP numbers may
climb again if the security situation further deteriorates in areas of where
the FNL is present.[18]
Sierra
Leone
Sierra Leone’s eleven year civil war
resulted in 50,000 deaths and the displacement of half of the country’s
population of 4.5 million, several hundred thousand of whom became refugees in
neighboring countries. The war officially ended in January 2002 bringing to a
close a third phase of the conflict that lasted five years and was
characterized by intermittent power struggles and peace efforts. The National Commission
for Resettlement, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (NCRRR) was established
during this period to co-ordinate humanitarian assistance, resettlement,
rehabilitation and reconstruction for IDPs, refugees and ex-combatants.
A Resettlement Strategy was developed which
provided the framework for humanitarian assistance and resettlement for the
IDPs, in which an underlying principle was that resettlement would only be
facilitated in areas that “allow for the return of displaced people in safety
and dignity.” Set criteria for the determination of such safety were developed
to guide the government and the international community in making informed
decisions on the safety of districts on a case-by-case basis. The resettlement
process was undertaken in five phases as various districts met the established
criteria; and by December 2002 all but two of the country’s 149 chiefdoms were
officially classified as safe for resettlement.[19] In 2002 a Presidential
election was conducted on the principle of proportional representation, as all
the IDPs had not yet been completely resettled either because of reluctance to
return to areas of origin, inadequate funds, incomplete disarmament, or
cross-border excursions by fighters from Liberia. In May 2003, the last two
chiefdoms in Kailahun were officially declared safe for resettlement. At the
same time, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone’s (UNAMSIL) was extended to 2005, and
the UN Missions in Liberia (UNMIL) was deployed.
With the exception of the Amputee and War
Wounded Camps in Aberdeen and Grafton, all of Sierra Leone’s IDP camps were
officially closed in early 2003 because of a lack of funds. All the IDPs –
numbering some 20,000 – were temporarily relocated to settlements in Grafton
and Waterloo (Western Area). As of 2004, a total of 430,000 registered IDPs had
returned home from camps (230,000) or local settlements (200,000) with
assistance from the Government and the international community, while the
majority of the unregistered IDPs, mainly living with friends and relations and
estimated to number about 1,500,000, returned home voluntarily without
assistance. Over time, the assistance strategy for IDPs was changed from
individual assistance to community-based support, so as to reduce dependency
and overcrowding in urban areas and to empower communities to contribute to
rebuilding their communities and restoring their livelihood systems.
For those IDPs who did return to their
areas of origin, humanitarian concerns such as shelter, health care, water and
sanitation, and education still required redress.[20] It is thus not surprising
that a significant number of those displaced by conflict chose to remain in
urban centers. Many collected the resettlement packages distributed by the
government but remained, while others returned briefly to their home areas only
to return again to urban centers. Two former IDP camps in Freetown were
converted into temporary settlements to accommodate these individuals, dubbed
as ‘homeless’ or ‘squatters’.[21] Officially, there are no more IDPs in Sierra
Leone;[22] although in 2003, NGOs operating in the country reported that 10,000
to 20,000 ‘unofficial’ IDPs remained in urban areas.
Lessons Learned
One conclusion to draw from Sierra Leone is
that even after peace and return, a proportion of former IDPs will remain
vulnerable and continue to require assistance. Another is that there is a
concern that such populations are not acknowledged by national governments. It
must be understood that internal displacement caused by the war affected the
entire country and not only specific segments of the country. A key challenge
Sierra Leone faced was whether to focus on individual IDPs or to help rebuild
communities so that those displaced could return and rebuild their lives.
Sierra Leone elected to change its strategy from individual assistance to
community-based. What is therefore needed in Sierra Leone today is continued
assistance toward community resettlement and rehabilitation.
Conclusions
The following conclusions from the
experience of these and other countries can be drawn:
1. Peace agreements alone are not
sufficient to trigger and achieve durable solutions for internally displaced
persons: While in some cases the cessation of hostilities or the conclusion of
a peace agreement may lead to spontaneous returns of internally displaced
persons; these often prove to be unsustainable; and in many other cases the
displaced hesitate to return as long as problems relating to security, access
to property, livelihoods, basic services and infrastructure remain.
2. In post-conflict situations, successful
return of IDPs to their homes and former places of habitual residence require
at least the following conditions :that their safety during and after returning
is guaranteed, that their property is restored and their houses are
reconstructed, and that an environment that sustains return is created by the
government and the international community. In this regard, the following
peacebuilding activities are particularly relevant for displaced persons and
returnees:
Security
Monitoring of a ceasefire or peace
agreement
Providing security through relocating
combatants, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration Re-establishment of local state authority
by strengthening capacities of good governance Judicial sector reform: re-establishing law
enforcement and the rule of law. Security sector reform comprising national
armed forces, security units and police Monitoring of the return of IDPs by
international actors or national actors (e.g. National Human Rights Institutions) Furthering reconciliation between local
communities and returnees Establishing family reunification
mechanisms
Property Restitution Restitution mechanisms should be conceived
in a way that supports parallel peacebuilding efforts that define procedures to
settle disputes over land and property rights Both the formal laws defining property and
tenure and informal or traditional practices and mechanisms should be taken
into account in defining the types of homes, lands and property that should be
subject to restitution or compensation Restitution processes must guard against
discrimination, in particular against female-headed households or minority
groups Restitution programs should be based on
both fair and accessible procedures and clear rules that balance the rights of
claimants against those of subsequent occupants Creating a sustainable environment
Undertaking post-conflict reconstruction,
i.e. re-establishing basic infrastructure and services Restitution of documentation to returnees
to allow them to access basic public services and education Ensuring access to livelihoods including
through the distribution of seeds and tools, de-mining of agricultural land,
micro-credit programs, non-discriminatory access of returnees to employment,
etc.
Ensuring the political transition to and
the establishment of an effective and legitimate government in which the
various sectors of society, including IDPs and returnees, can become
stakeholders
3. The quality of the process leading to
durable solutions is another key element necessary for ensuring its
sustainability: The decision of internally displaced persons whether to return
or opt for another solution must be voluntary, i.e. made in the absence of
coercion, and based on full and accurate information; and they must be allowed
to participate in decisions affecting their future in order to make them
responsible actors in the recovery process.
4. Many of the measures necessary to
achieve durable solutions are part of any peacebuilding efforts, but they may
be insufficient successfully to solve displacement situations unless they are
tailored to the specific needs of returnees and communities receiving them.
Peacebuilding activities that fail to address the specific needs of IDPs may
benefit non-displaced communities but preserve or even reinforce obstacles to
sustainable return and reintegration. In this context, consulting returnees as
well as receiving communities about specific displacement-related needs is
essential.
5. Activities addressing the need for
safety, property restitution and reconstruction, as well as an environment
sustaining return, should take place to the extent possible in parallel: A
phased approach focusing initially on security issues and with other activities
relegated to a later phase risks creating a gap between the humanitarian phase
and the reconstruction/development phase. Efforts should be made to integrate a
development perspective at an early stage of return/recovery, although the
situation still may be too volatile and not conducive for traditional
development projects. Such efforts must be robust enough to overcome the
traditional dichotomies of the humanitarian and the development logics
(short-term versus long-term; transition versus sustainability as goals;
communities as beneficiaries versus communities as actors, etc.)
6. To be able to address early recovery
needs as soon as windows of opportunity for returns open, funding must be made
available quickly and in a flexible way even if humanitarian needs are no
longer pressing and long-term development activities seem premature: In this
regard, the Peacebuilding Fund fills an important gap but it is insufficient to
solve the current systemic problems of donor funding that is still too strongly
structured around the humanitarian – development dichotomy.
[1] Brookings-Bern Project on Internal
Displacement, Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace
Agreements and Peace-Building. Washington, DC: Brookings-Bern Project on
Internal Displacement, September 2007.
[2] Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre, Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in
2006, Geneva: IDMC, April 2007
[3] UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2006,
Geneva: UNHCR
[4] Brookings-Bern Project on Internal
Displacement – Georgetown University, When Internal Displacement Ends – A
Framework for Durable Solutions, Washington, DC: Brookings-Bern Project on
Internal Displacement, June 2007
[5] IDMC, Sudan: Outlook for IDPs remains
bleak, 12 October 2007
[6] Report of the Representative of the
Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Mission
to the Sudan, E/CN.4/2006/71/Add.6, February 2006
[7] OCHA Abidjan, Press Release, 15
February 2008
[8] Report of the Representative of the
Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Mission
to Bosnia and Herzegovina, E/CN.4/2006/71/Add.4, December 2005
[9] Williams Rhodri C., The contemporary
right to property restitution in the context of transitional justice, New York:
International Center for Transitional Justice Occasional Paper Series, May 2007
[10] These bodies included a Commission for
Real Property Claims of Refugees and Displaced Persons (CRPC) as well as a high
court, the Human Rights Chamber, that ruled several landmark cases related to
property restitution
[11] www.ohr.int/plip
[12] BBC, ‘Breakthrough’ for Burundi peace’
2005
[13] IRIN, Peace Process Must be Concluded
by End of Year – Mediator, 2007
[14] IDMC, ‘Burundi: Long Term IDPs Still
Wait for Durable Solutions Despite Improved Security,’ 2007
[15] IDMC, 2006
[16] IDMC, ‘Burundi: Long Term IDPs Still
Wait for Durable Solutions Despite Improved Security,’ 2007
[17] Ibid
[18] IRIN, Burundi: Thousands of Displaced
Need Assistance, 2008
[19] ‘Updated Profile Sierra Leone’ The
Global IDP Project, 2003
[20] ‘Updated Profile Sierra Leone’ The
Global IDP Project, 2003
[21] ‘Sierra Leone’ The Global IDP Project,
2004
[22] ‘Updated Profile Sierra Leone’ The
Global IDP Project, 2003
Internal
displace person
Not to be confused with the term
"displaced person", which may include both internally displaced
persons and refugees.
An internally displaced person (IDP) is
someone who is forced to flee his or her home but who remains within his or her
country's borders. [2] They are often referred to as refugees, although they do
not fall within the legal definitions of a refugee.[3]
IDPs in 2015[1]
Total population 37.494 million
Regions with significant populations
Middle East and North Africa 13.933 million
Africa 10.762 million
Americas 7.113 million
Asia and the Pacific 2.879 million
Europe 2.804 million
Villagers fleeing gunfire in a camp for
internally displaced persons during the 2008 Nord-Kivu war
Tailor in Labuje IDP camp in Uganda.
At the end of 2014, it was estimated there
were 38.2 million IDPs worldwide, the highest level since 1989, the first year
for which global statistics on IDPs are available. The countries with the
largest IDP populations were Syria (7.6 million), Colombia (6 million), Iraq
(3.6 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2.8 million), Sudan (2.2
million), South Sudan (1.6 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Nigeria (1.2
million) and Somalia (1.1 million).[4]
The United Nations and UNHCR support
monitoring and analysis of worldwide IDPs through the Geneva-based Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre.[2][5]
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Internally displaced person
Not to be confused with the term
"displaced person", which may include both internally displaced
persons and refugees.
Definition
Whereas 'refugee' has an authoritative
definition under the 1951 Refugee Convention, there is no universal legal
definition of internally displaced persons (IDP); only a regional treaty for
African countries (see Kampala Convention). However, a United Nations report,
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement uses the definition of:
"persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights
or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognized State border."[6]
While the above stresses two important
elements of internal displacement (coercion and the domestic/internal
movement), it is important to note that, rather than a strict definition, the
Guiding Principles offer "a descriptive identification of the category of
persons whose needs are the concern of the Guiding Principles".[7] In this
way, the document "intentionally steers toward flexibility rather than
legal precision"[8] as the words "in particular" indicate that
the list of reasons for displacement is not exhaustive. However, as Erin Mooney
has pointed out, "global statistics on internal displacement generally
count only IDPs uprooted by conflict and human rights violations. Moreover, a
recent study has recommended that the IDP concept should be defined even more
narrowly, to be limited to persons displaced by violence."[9] Thus,
despite the non-exhaustive reasons of internal displacement, many consider IDPs
as those who would be defined as refugees if they were to cross an
international border, hence, the term refugees in all but name is often applied
to IDPs.
IDP
populations Edit
It is very difficult to get accurate
figures for internally displaced persons because populations aren't constant.
IDPs may be returning home while others are fleeing, others may periodically
return to IDP camps to take advantage of humanitarian aid. While the case of
IDPs in large camps such as those in Darfur, western Sudan, are relatively
well-reported, it is very difficult to assess those IDPs who flee to larger
towns and cities. It is necessary in many instances to supplement official
figures with additional information obtained from operational humanitarian
organizations on the ground. Thus, the 24.5 million figure must be treated as
an estimate.[10] Additionally, most official figures only include those
displaced by conflict or natural disasters. Development-induced IDPs often are
not included in assessments. It has been estimated that between 70 and 80% of
all IDPs are women and children.[11]
50% of internally displaced people and
refugees were thought to be in urban areas in 2010, many of them in protracted
displacement with little likelihood of ever returning home. A 2013 study found
that these protracted urban displacements had not been given due weight by
international aid and governance as historically they had focused on rural cam
displacement responses.[12] The study argues that this protracted urban
displacement needs a fundamental change in the approach to those who are
displaced and their host societies. They note that re-framing responses to
urban displacement will also involve human rights and development actors and
local and national governments. They call for a change in the narrative around
the issue is needed to reflect ingenuity and fortitude displayed by displaced
populations, the opportunities for self-sufficiency and safety represented by
urban areas, and that the displaced can make a contribution to their host
societies.[12] An updated country by country breakdown can be found online.[13]
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